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Abstract: The Social Constructionist and Biologically Realist views of human races are often presented as mutually 
exclusive alternatives. Surprisingly, this debate has its origin in work on blood group population genetics. A finding that 
the greater part of human genetic variation lies within populations, rather than between races, has led some to deny the 
reality of geographically limited biological clusters. An extension of this view maintains that any differences that may exist 
are distributed in clinal fashion along ancient human migration routes precluding reliable delineation of racial clusters.  
Here I argue that new genetic data adequately demonstrate that statistically significantly differentiated human subgroups 
(aka biological races) do exist. Further, that the analytical methods used to reconstruct the history of these human 
clusters are themselves, in part, social constructs. Therefore, these two contrasting philosophical viewpoints may be 
seen as capable of working together. Indeed, they are a sub-element of a larger metaphysical debate regarding the 
reality or otherwise of race, social or biological. I conclude by stressing the importance of racial definitions as regards the 
collection of reliable census information, the formation of equitable social policies and better informed medical decisions, 
particularly those involving the prescription of pharmaceuticals. 
Keywords: Biological realism, Social constructionism, Genetic variation, Human races. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Ideas about human races have a long history and 
now occupy an entire sub-discipline of Philosophy. 
Consequently, this subject has a huge literature and no 
single article can capture every facet of the rich history 
of the field. This abundance is reflected in the 
extensive reference list at the end of this article, which 
is chosen so that readers may as far as possible gain 
access to the entire area. A great deal of recent 
discussion has centred around the academic tension 
between those who think that human races can be 
mapped directly on to some biological property or 
properties (Biological Realists; BR) versus those who 
argue that the idea of races emerges from societal 
processes and our imaginations (Social 
Constructionists, SC). In this article I will argue that at 
best this is a form of intellectual pseudo-competition 
because these ideas cannot legitimately be seen as 
genuinely exclusive alternatives. Rather, in my view, it 
is better to ask if each in turn is true (and I will argue 
that they are) and then if they can live together (and I 
will argue that they can). From here, I will take up 
Lemeire’s point [1] that this is all part of a bigger 
question; i.e. are human races (social or biological) real 
or not? 
The whole BR vs. SC debate is made even more 
difficult by problems around communication having to 
do with the meaning of the word ‘race’ itself in this  
 
 
*Address correspondence to this author at the School of Biological Sciences, 
Victoria university of Wellington, PO Box 600, Wellington, 6140, New Zealand; 
Tel: +644-463-6091; Fax: +644-463-5331;  
E-mail: geoff.chambers@vuw.ac.nz 
context. First, the term is used as a descriptor at all and 
every level of human population structure; i.e. from the 
totality of the human race in all its aspects all the way 
on down to specific populations, such as the Maori race 
or the Indian race, etc. Second, over the last one 
hundred years common practical usage of the term has 
slowly moved from an ancestry-based concept using 
phenotypic characters, through ethnicity (which 
combines ancestry with cultural practice) to today’s 
democratic standard of ethnic affiliation by self-
declaration [2, 3]. There can be very little doubt that 
this last definition is a social construct and indeed the 
consensus of received wisdom from Sociologists who 
seem to be resolutely in the Social Construction camp. 
However, empirical genetic data [4] show that even this 
system of classification has some biological basis. 
Finally, the contest between definitions is frequently 
bundled with the larger question: Does race qualify as 
a real thing (or real kind)? Some may feel that in part 
this comes down to how one might choose to define 
race. Thus, many writers appear to treat biological 
races as real and social constructs as not real. I think 
that doing so may be premature because in my view 
the SC and BR positions at best only represent a 
pseudo-contest distinct from the real or not question. 
The proximal origin of the present BR vs. SC debate 
can be traced to a single paper [5] by Lewontin which 
provides a preliminary quantitative estimate of genetic 
variation within and between human populations. His 
finding that the former is much larger than the latter has 
been widely adopted as a platform for the SC position; 
a tradition that continues even to the present, for 
example see [6]. Remarkably, this position has been 
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maintained despite Edwards’ clear explanation [7] why 
correlated genetic signals still allow reliable partitioning 
of humans into clusters. I begin my discussion with a 
brief retelling of this story and proceed to show how 
this argument has developed up to the present day. I 
conclude by making a claim to demonstrate that the SC 
and BR schools do not represent a dichotomy and, 
further, that genetic differences between population 
groups are too important to ignore, particularly in 
regard to their medical significance. Throughout this 
work I will make reference to key papers that represent 
especially influential contributions and from which 
readers should be able to reconstruct the wider 
literature. 
2. THE DEBATE 
2.1. Round 1: Edwards Versus Lewontin 
In 1972 Lewontin published his analysis of blood 
group data from around the world [5] and was able for 
the first time to provide hierarchical quantitative 
estimates for the distribution of this form of genetic 
variation. His choice of target was astute because the 
genetic bases of these polymorphisms was well 
established and abundant, geographically widespread 
data were available from hospitals worldwide. His 
estimates have been included in numerous 
publications, but they are well worth repeating here. He 
found (p. 396) that 85.4% of total species diversity is 
contained within populations with a further 8.3% 
accounted for by differences between populations 
within a race and only 6.3% is accounted for by racial 
classification. This allowed him to make the following 
claim about: 
“the largest part by far of human variation being 
accounted for by the differences between individuals” 
Which in turn lead to the bold conclusion: 
“Human racial classification is of no social value …. 
no justification can be offered for its continuance” 
Today’s investigators might offer many criticisms of 
Lewontin’s experimental design because human 
taxonomy has advanced considerably since then. For 
instance, his population categories include one called 
Oceanian. This is worrying on at least three counts. 
First, like Amerind, it is derivative of other Asian 
categories. Second, it is formed by reticulation and 
admixture and (between Mongoloid and Australoid 
groups). Third, it contains representatives from 
Polynesian and Melanesian populations who have 
different admixture fractions [8, 9]. In addition, the 
placement of some national groups into racial 
categories is questionable. For example, Malayans and 
Filipinos are grouped with Mongoloids when they have 
greater affinity with the two Oceanic subgroups listed 
above. Ditto Madagascans who are grouped with Black 
Africans. There is no doubt that these complications do 
add noise to the signal. However, it probably matters 
little because others have often replicated these 
findings in various types of genetic survey since this 
time and consistently validated the general conclusion; 
see [10] for a list of subsequent studies. So, although 
perhaps contemporary commentators should be 
discouraged from quoting these actual figures, 
Lewontin’s general observation [5] remains robust and 
his paper continues as a genuine celebration of human 
individuality. 
The more important question is whether the 
conclusion he draws from it is correct. Edwards [8] 
makes a strong claim that Lewontin’s observation is a 
red herring in the race debate. He carefully explains 
that because the frequencies of allelic variants at 
different loci are correlated, then these data can 
reliably be used to cluster groups regardless of the 
overall distribution of this variation. This concept has 
been well illustrated in theoretical diagrams and lengthy 
explanations [11,12]. Thus for example, if one has loci 
A and B with alternate alleles A1 and A2 and B1 and B2 
and both the A1 and B1 alleles are 10x more common in 
population X than population Y then scoring these 
markers together can be used as a diagnostic to assign 
individuals to these groups; here an A1A1;B1B1 
homozygote is 10, 000 times more likely to be an X 
rather than a Y. The above references have much 
more elaborate expositions of the mathematic logic 
behind the wider concept. Later papers from Lewontin 
and colleagues [13,14] do not entirely dispute this view, 
but do reaffirm their earlier findings based on newer 
microsatellite data and suggest that the clusters may 
not be as clearly defined as some scholars might think. 
This view has been taken up at length by Templeton 
[15] and I will return to this point in Round 3 below. 
Ultimately Edwards [7] is drawn to the conclusion 
that: 
“it is not true to say … that you can’t predict 
someone’s race from their genes” 
One might think that this struck a death blow to the 
SC school, but far from it. Instead, an extended debate 
sprang up regarding the very nature of population 
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genetic analysis and some [16, 17] still cling to their 
original interpretation regarding the significance of 
Lewontin’s partition. 
2.2. Round 2: The Sociological Establishment 
Fights Back 
It is ironic that SC has such strong foundations in 
population genetics when its response to later 
developments in the field has been to go on the 
defensive. Indeed, their position was already strongly 
entrenched with SC endorsements coming from both 
the American Anthropological Association [18] and the 
American Sociological Association [19] and see [20]. 
The language used by some members of the SC 
school is colourful indeed with biological race called 
“fiction”, “a unicorn” and “the phlogiston of our time” 
ultimately destined to “follow the flat Earth into oblivion” 
– see Sesardic [21] for an account. Sussman has 
devoted an entire book [22] to present race as “The 
troubling persistence of an unscientific idea”. Those 
social scientists who have strayed from the orthodox 
path have been chastised because they were arguing 
for “the utility of genetic data in sociological analyses”; 
see [23] for a list of the culprits. This is not a conspiracy 
per se by my estimation, but more of a social and 
intellectual programme motivated in large part by a 
perceived need to protect against an imagined re-
emergence of Eugenics and the genuinely worst 
excesses of racist policies. So, the stakes are high and 
the response is vigorous. 
In turn, the SC programme has been cited as an 
outstanding example of left-wing thinking and political 
correctness taken to excess via “groupthink” and 
“confirmation bias” [24]. This last descriptor is a 
euphemism for the suppression of opposing 
viewpoints. This author goes on to quote the example 
of a letter to the New York Times signed by more than 
one hundred sociologists denouncing Wade’s book, A 
troublesome inheritance [25] as inaccurate, but failing 
to provide any concrete examples. A key issue was 
Wade’s view that variation has developed in 8% of the 
human genome since the first Out of Africa migrations 
and this partitions humans into 5 easily distinguishable 
races which have arisen in response to regional 
environmental challenges. These people are Africans, 
East Asians, Caucasians, Native Americans and the 
Aboriginal peoples of Australia and Papua New Guinea 
(herein after termed a K = 5 partition solution). 
Whatever one may more generally think about Wade’s 
idea as expressed in this work, the K = 5 model must 
be viewed as pretty reasonable and many others have 
come up with more or less the same partitions (see 
later). However, should one prefer to reject it, then this 
should be done supported by reasoned argument, 
rather than simply dismissing it out of hand. 
Finally, I note in passing a further interesting feature 
of social behaviour in this controversy. The views of 
population geneticists who advocate the SC position 
seem to be granted considerable weight; e.g. 
particularly scholars such as Long and Templeton  
[15, 26]. Often this seems to be disproportionate 
regarding their particular contributions regarding the 
question. Whereas other scholars working in the same 
area rarely seem to get a mention in the SC canon. I 
term this phenomenon ‘artificial inflation of the 
academic authority of presumed defectors’. Appiah [27] 
and Fullerton [28] present detailed accounts of the 
attacks by SC proponents on the BR programme. 
Thus, sadly, rather than embrace new genetic 
findings the SC school has elected to challenge them in 
a multiplicity of ways. Frank [23] shows how the battle 
lines were drawn by Duster who in his 2005 
presidential address [29] to the American Sociological 
Association called upon members to  
“prepare to defend against the genomic data 
juggernaut heading their way down the pike” [23] 
Many authors have contributed to the debate which 
followed, but the writing of Kaplan, Winther and 
colleagues probably comes closest to the SC/BR 
interface in their detailed examination of the way that 
population genetic analysis works. I will now explore 
these contributions in some detail together with my 
analysis and contrasting views from other 
commentators such as Sesardic and Spencer. Kaplan 
and Winther [30] begin by crediting Mills [31] with the 
origin of the constructionist/realist classification and 
present his taxonomic view of the metaphysics of race. 
They next embark on an extended historical tour 
through the Edwards/Lewontin debate and seek 
resolution by considering genetic variation as diversity, 
differentiation and heterozygosity , including a valuable 
plain language explanation of the mathematics 
involved. Ultimately they arrive at what they recognise 
as Objectivist Constructionism to use one of Mills’ 
original categories. Here, they do recognise that there 
must be some genetic structure in human populations, 
but that it is insufficient to allow classification and 
thereby avoid becoming ‘prisoners of abstraction’ 
because, they claim that ‘using biological theory to 
ground race is a pernicious reification’. Fine words, but 
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wide of the mark, I think, because they do not 
adequately dispose of Edwards’ facts [7] about 
correlation among allele frequencies at different loci. 
There are further problematic issues with their 
otherwise interesting paper which are covered by 
Spencer in a detailed and more formal philosophical 
analysis [32]. 
Winther moves on to consider the use of genetic 
data in phylogenetic and clustering analyses [6], which 
is more directly to the point in relation to trying to define 
biological races. He makes the important point that, 
although these are directed towards the same ends, 
their methodologies are different and include different 
assumptions. The fact that operators must make 
decisions about setting parameters in these analytical 
models and assign diagnostic limits to define clusters is 
highly significant in my view and a point that I will return 
to later. One should also note that these two general 
approaches are different. Clustering analyses 
(unsupervised fuzzy genetic clustering, multidimensio- 
nal scaling and principal components and principal co-
ordinates) return differentiated groups without 
indicating any preferred hierarchical ancestral history 
linking them. Phylogenetic analysis has many different 
forms (including phenetic distance, cladistics, 
maximum likelihood, Bayesian, Hadamard and network 
methods), but all of them return the history, even if they 
may not always agree with one another or give a clear 
clustering scheme; Long and Kittles [26] cover many of 
these same points with worked examples [26]. This 
puts a premium on the investigator’s ability to interpret 
the output. One example of a study which uses both 
types of analysis is that of Friedlaender et al. [33] on 
Pacific Islanders and I will refer to this again too. 
Winther also highlights the concerns expressed here 
about the subjective human factor in input assumptions 
for models and output interpretation [6]. Kaplan and 
Winter [34] further suggest that even having more data 
from genomics is not necessarily going to make things 
better and also stress the clines versus clusters 
dilemma [35] with regards to interpretation or 
phylogenetic patterns. 
Finally, the wider debate has been examined in 
detail by Spencer [36] who recognises four principal 
semantic and metaphysical objections that 
philosophers of race have put forward against 
biological realists who rely on the new genetic 
clustering studies to support their own position. In my 
view this is a particularly valuable contribution and a 
helpful source of reference material. So Spencer’s 
ideas clearly merit consideration in depth in the context 
of this article while noting that they are primarily 
directed towards US racial groups. He begins from the 
position that human population structure really does 
look racial (a central theme of this commentary) and 
surveys a number of studies that illustrate this view 
including [33]. He does note that various studies of 
worldwide populations have returned different numbers 
of major clusters (aka K values = statistically supported 
data partitions) when examined using unsupervised 
fuzzy genetic (UFG) methods; clustering algorithms 
such as STRUCTURE, frappe, admixture, etc. and see 
[35] and [37] for lists of names and explanations of how 
they work). However, many such analyses do converge 
on what I earlier termed as a ‘K = 5 solution’ viz N 
Africa, S Africa, W Eurasia, E Eurasia and Americas 
plus Oceania [38] and recognising that this differs from 
the scheme in [25]. These five major groups map 
closely with the official US racial groups. Spencer also 
notes that biologists routinely use these methods to 
classify within and between species of clusters of other 
organisms without raising concerns about what they 
are doing or why. Beyond this commentary the present 
author notes that clustering and admixture analyses of 
human populations have now reached an exceptionally 
powerful stage of their development and have been 
shown to be effective at a national scale [39] or across 
continental Europe [40] and Island Southeast Asia [41]: 
also see [42, 43] for recent global perspectives based 
on very large datasets. However, it must also be 
recognised that other workers have presented K = 3 
and various K = 4 solutions for humans as a whole. 
And, further, that when using tree-building methods, it 
is the analysts themselves that finally decide the best K 
number equivalent solution by lumping and splitting 
partitions albeit guided by a statistical test. 
In Spencer’s view [36] the first (semantic) objection 
to a genetic clustering diagnosis of race is discreteness 
i.e. that clinal variation and/or admixture obscures 
clusters [35]. Proponents of this view worry about such 
things as the hypodescent or ‘one-drop’ rule that has in 
the past been used to classify a person with any 
fraction of African descent as Black. Spencer 
diagnoses this (correctly in my opinion) as a signal to 
noise problem and not one that creates significant 
practical difficulty quoting the study of Guo et al. [4] as 
supporting evidence. I think one must agree with this 
assessment. The second (semantic) objection is 
visibility i.e. that (US) racial groups are recognisable by 
their phenotypic characters. While this idea [44] may be 
valid under some forms of racial discourse it is both 
retrograde in the sense of changing definitions 
discussed earlier and unhelpful. Spencer explains that 
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many observers might not easily distinguish Africans 
from Melanesians (another recurrent theme of the 
present article). 
The third objection (metaphysical) is parochial to 
some extent, but nonetheless called the very important 
objection. This states that for US racial groups (e.g. as 
captured by US Census Bureau, USCB) to be 
biologically real, they must form a very important 
biological classification sometimes equated to sub-
species status. Objectors such as Templeton [45] and 
maintain that fixation index (FST) values between the 
human K = 5 groups are smaller than those for 
chimpanzee subspecies, therefore there are no human 
subspecies and thus the K = 5 groups are not 
biologically important. Spencer argues that importance 
per se is not the issue. What matters is if the groups 
are real. In my view, the objection is simply unfair and I 
will return to this point in my discussion of human 
taxonomy later. The fourth (also metaphysical) 
objection is the objectively real objection i.e. that 
human races do not exist independent of human 
thought processes. Spencer argues that a willingness 
even to raise this objection shows that we should not 
continue to contrast biological realism with social 
constructionism. Putting it another way, stars are stars 
regardless of whether we choose to gaze upon them or 
not. The debate begins once we ask if using the signs 
of the zodiac is the best way to organise our thinking 
about them. 
2.3. Round 3: A Proposed Road to Redemption and 
Reconciliation 
In the paragraphs that follow I will attempt to show 
that 1) human races are real biological entities 
theoretically accessible via more or less objective 
means, but 2) practically inaccessible without the 
intervention of human agency and therefore also social 
constructs to some greater or lesser extent. 
I begin by returning to the value of term ‘race’ as a 
descriptor. In previous works my colleagues and I have 
rejected the use of this term entirely [2, 3]. We do not 
do this just because the term is emotionally and 
politically loaded. We do it, first because it is used to 
describe units at all levels of the human taxonomic 
hierarchy, and second because the definition has been 
shifting over time. In this latter regard, usage has 
progressed from one based on ancestry, appearance 
and behaviour, via the idea of ethnicity (being some 
combination of ancestry and cultural practice) through 
to self-declared ethnic affiliation. This last form has 
found widespread appeal and application and I think 
most would agree that it is for the best that people 
should be known by the collective term that they prefer 
to use themselves. This definition is not entirely 
ancestry free, but it can be. Consider, for example the 
Cherokee Freedmen who are the descendants of 
African slaves, but who identify as Amerindians [46]. 
There are two added complications, first that different 
agencies collect race/ethnicity data using different 
questions and so collect information from different 
groups of people under a single heading and second 
that official forms sometimes do and sometimes do not 
allow responders to nominate multiple categories. For 
instance, it is a common experience for someone 
meeting a US citizen for the first time to learn early on 
in their relationship that their new friend is actually 
Italian, German or Irish. Worse still, when official 
categories require, or seem to require, a knowledge of 
ancestry, then responses may be unreliable. Family 
histories may be romanticised, people may be 
uninformed adoptees or have missed paternity or 
simply not understand the question. 
I now return to the beginning of the entire 
discussion taking my lead from Lewontin [5] and 
Spencer [36] to claim that there seems to be something 
intuitively obvious about the biological reality of human 
races. Presented with a simple K = 3 thought 
experiment most people would probably agree that one 
could distinguish an indigenous African Zulu from a 
Scandinavian and from a Han Chinese, just based on 
appearance. Again most, if not all, scientists would 
anticipate confirmation by genetic testing. However, 
once we begin to recruit a few other volunteers for our 
imaginary identity parade, then things get more 
complicated e.g. try adding an Arab, an Amerindian or 
a Polynesian into the line-up. However, despite the 
addition of one, or even all, of them one would still 
expect genetic diagnosis to work. The key question 
becomes; How far may we continue this process. In 
other words; How many human groups can we reliably 
recognise using genetic methods? One should note 
along the way that this answer will probably depend on 
how many samples one can analyse, how many loci 
one can examine and how extensive and reliable are 
the data for reference populations. 
I am going to argue that these questions have 
parallels with what is known to biologists and 
philosophers as ‘The species problem’ – see [47] for an 
earlier discussion of this topic. I begin like [12] by 
asking if humans are polytypic? Answering this 
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question starts right at the top and discussion around 
this problem will be used help to draw one of the major 
conclusions in this work concerning the intrusion of 
subjectivity in phylogenetic analyses. This matter 
comes down to needing to decide where to draw 
barriers between clades and how one can make these 
decisions. It is like deciding just how many celestial 
bodies should make up the star sign Virgo. For 
humans, one must decide if extinct closely related 
hominids including, but not necessarily limited to, 
Neanderthals and Denisovans should be included in 
Homo sapiens; see [2, 3] for a discussion. Nobody to 
my knowledge has suggested that the even older H. 
erectus should be lumped with H. sapiens. However, 
there may be some die hard multi-regionalists who 
might even consider this prospect seriously. There is 
no doubt that each of these three more modern and 
more closely related taxa named above forms a distinct 
clade in its own right in any and all types of 
phylogenetic exercise and do so despite fairly 
extensive previous interbreeding. The issue is just 
where to draw the bounds around each cluster. So, 
here we have a genuine example of the interface 
between BR and SC contributions to our understanding 
of just what it is to be human. We are real, as are our 
extinct cousins, and thus BR entities, but do we want to 
admit them into our family as part of a SC community? 
Let’s now move on down a step and suppose for the 
sake of progressing the debate that we have decided to 
exclude our extinct relatives. When we examine the  
H. sapiens tree (or more correctly trees) one can see at 
once that it has obvious internal clade structure that 
maps fairly well on geographical distributions and 
having all African lineages as basal. So should we sub-
divide the tree? This is not a new idea as [48] had a K 
= 4 solution with H. s. europeus, H. s. asiaticus, H. s. 
americanus and H. s. afrer; and see [49] for further 
discussion around this topic. Here it is correctly 
recognised that in Zoology the first taxonomic division 
of species is into sub-species and one might even 
consider applying the well-known 75% diagnosability 
rule [50] to aid in decision making. Now we are in real 
trouble. First, nobody seems to want to even think 
seriously about splitting humans into subspecies 
(except to run the straw man argument in comparison 
with chimpanzees). Second, many subclades of 
humans are better than 75% diagnosable – there are 
up to 38 of such things alive in the world today; i.e. 
human taxa recognisable as distinct individual species 
under the Phylogenetic Species Concept (PSC) 
according to [12] based on Cavali-Sforza et al.’s sub-
continental populations [51, 52]. I confidently suggest 
that nobody wants this solution, defensible or 
otherwise. In zoological taxonomy the rank below 
subspecies is often known as ‘a race’ although some, 
like [45], treat race and subspecies as more or less 
equivalent terms. A zoological race is generally taken 
as being a group or population of animals or birds with 
a recognisable (usually phenotypic) character, such as 
particularly dark skin or plumage colouration. Such 
characters often have variable expression and do not 
meet the 75% diagnosability requirement. Confusingly, 
these are also sometimes known as ‘morphs’, 
particularly when they are intermixed with other types 
within populations. Neither of these terms is easily 
transferable to humans and the use of the term race in 
this way by biologists is one further reason why 
Callister et al. [2, 3] prefer not to use it in connection 
with humans. 
Before leaving this topic and considering the 
analytical methods themselves some mention must be 
made of the fairly widespread claims that human 
genetic variation is clinal and not discrete [35]. There 
can be little doubt that this proposition is true to some 
extent, but the critical question would seem to be; Does 
this obscure the boundaries of the major clades to such 
an extent that they are ambiguous? If this is the case, 
then the clades or clusters are in the eye of the 
beholder and cannot be much other than social 
constructs. If human evolution had occurred simply by 
a limited number of discrete migrations out of Africa 
along geographic lines of ancestor-descendant 
lineages, i.e. in a strictly tree like fashion, then 
phylogeneticists would have little or no problem 
reconstructing their history from DNA sequences. 
Clearly, this is not the case and the more we discover 
about human evolution, the more it is not the case. We 
now have examples of back migration, semi-continuous 
gene flow along lineages and reticulation (sometimes 
gender-biased) between lineages [15]. The process is 
somewhat akin to the formation of what are known as 
‘ring species’ in birds (e.g. some types of seagulls and 
warblers). Here adjacent populations may be more or 
less indistinguishable, but those at the ends of the 
distribution (i.e. at the point where the ring closes) are 
distinct and no longer able to interbreed. Of course, the 
human situation is not quite this extreme, but the ring 
species model is a useful guide when thinking about 
clinal variation. 
These features all add noise to the phylogenetic 
signal, but not sufficient to obscure it. The model study 
of Friedlaender et al. [33] provides a good illustration of 
the power of contemporary analytical methods to 
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identify 5 local clusters and understand their 
relationships. Here, a Polynesian population (NZ Maori) 
were shown as a discrete cluster, but with a 
phylogenetic placement linking them to both 
Austronesian (Mongoloid) and Papuan (Australoid) 
peoples. The other studies referred to earlier in Europe 
[40] and SE Asia [41] are even more impressive 
examples of how this all works. Two other lessons may 
be taken from the Friedlaender et al. study cited above. 
First, their result was achieved with only relatively small 
sample sizes and using relatively few loci compared 
with contemporary standards. Second, it illustrates how 
UFG and phylogenetic analyses may be combined to 
advantage to resolve complex historical patterns of 
relationship. In their study the ancestral Polynesian 
lineage is reticulate and formed by extensive gender-
biased admixture as recently as around 3000 ybp. 
I turn, at last, to consider subjective elements in 
cluster and phylogenetic analysis procedures. This is a 
fairly well-recognised issue among specialists and I am 
certainly not the first to mention it in relation to human 
evolutionary studies. First, come decisions about which 
populations/datasets to sample, how many individuals 
to include, which loci to collect data from and finally 
which reference populations to include. Many of the 
decisions will be driven by the multi-factorial 
contingency that is the reality of research work 
everywhere. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that all 
require human input. These factors are not denied by 
investigators, but often go unnoticed or unremarked. 
Next, come the analyses, the UFG methods are 
relatively innocent in this regard. One puts the data in 
and the truth emerges – or so one might hope. One still 
has to pick a method, decide on how and where to 
place divisions between clusters and then to allocate 
names to them. Using multiple methods and hopefully 
obtaining congruent patterns is a good way to try to 
avoid biases due to analytical method. The various 
versions of the STRUCTURE algorithm have an 
internal likelihood routine that picks a value for K (the 
number of partitions best supported by the data). All 
well and good and driven by the data. However, in 
practice the analysis often returns clustering patterns 
with K + 1 and/or K – 1 partitions that are as good as or 
almost as good as the K partition arrangement. In 
fairness to investigators it should be recognised that 
they do usually present these alternatives either in the 
report itself or include them in online supplementary 
material. This ensures that nothing is hidden and the 
relative merits of all alternatives can be scrutinized. But 
in the end a human agent must decide which is best. 
Phylogenetic tree construction algorithms are 
objective, but require humans to set a whole range of 
parameters before they can operate. These include; 
tree searching method, definition of the best tree, 
model of DNA sequence evolution and statistical 
testing of alternatives. Finally, one must decide which 
branches to lump into a clade and if a consistent rule is 
to be applied to this process across the whole tree. 
This is a particularly difficult task because it often 
amounts to trying to impose a discrete categorization 
on a semi-continuously distributed output. Some of the 
other problems can be reduced e.g. by using a 
computational routine like Model Test to select the 
model of evolution for use in maximum likelihood 
analyses. Also using multiple tree building methods 
helps to build confidence when they converge on 
identical or near identical solutions. In summary, 
everything in this and the preceding paragraph goes to 
build my case that what may very well be biologically 
real entities in terms of distinct genetic cluster of 
humans can only be discovered by processes involving 
more or less direct human intervention. In other words, 
although races may be biologically real entities, they 
are necessarily social constructs too. 
3. WHY IT ALL MATTERS SO MUCH AND TO SO 
MANY 
By my estimation there are three principal reasons 
why increasing our understanding of human races is 
important. The first is to gain insights into human 
evolution and has already been explored fairly 
thoroughly above. The second is to promote social 
equity and combat discrimination. One of the reasons 
that social scientists seem to abhor the BR model of 
race is that they fear it may work against these ends 
[16, 53]. This view seems to be founded in racial 
constructs popular in the C. 19th. Here biological races 
are claimed to exhibit characteristic phenotypes (mainly 
through their physical appearance) and behaviours. 
This leads to the formation of prejudicial stereotypes; 
so, if you are Chinese, then you must like table tennis 
and be very good at playing it or be addicted to 
gambling and smoke copious amounts of opium etc. 
These sorts of statements stem from common type of 
transition from sense to nonsense founded on some 
easily recognised lapses in logic. I describe these 
below, but first some facts about life. There really is a 
clear genetic link between ancestry, appearance and 
behaviour. One should never be afraid to recognise 
these relationships. All human physical, intellectual and 
behavioural characters do have some greater or lesser 
genetic component. For individuals, these are shaped 
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by our package of allelic variants, but also influenced 
by our environment and the interaction between these 
variants and the environment (aka GxE effects). 
Recent advances in the field of epigenetics show how 
environmental influences can alter gene expression, 
closing the circle of cause and effect. Different traits 
have different contributions from each of these factors. 
Their relative contributions are unknown and, for 
technical reasons, unknowable without making 
assumptions in analysis of twin and adoption study 
data. The much criticised idea of biological determinism 
is said to arise from holding the view that heritage is 
paramount. This view seems to be reified in the popular 
phrase “It’s in our DNA”, but nothing could be further 
from the truth as the usage implies the meaning “It is 
traditional for our social group to do this sort of thing”. 
In short, Biological Realism is at heart an 
essentialist view, but not in the sense of equating to 
Biological Determinism. It should not be invoked to 
explain causality. Thus speaking Swahili may fairly be 
said to run in families, but not for exclusively genetic 
reasons. There is a genetic component in the sense of 
general and specific language ability. There is also an 
environmental component in the form of exposure to 
written or spoken Swahili. Finally, there is a GxE 
component that relates to one’s response to teaching 
methods and circumstances e.g. childhood exposure to 
native speakers vs. missionary training school. 
Different people will respond differently to these various 
experiences and teachers. Thus the BR view is 
determinist, but only conditionally determinist at best.  
It is my view that we should never fear or deny 
empirically observable differences between racial 
groups, but we should always be very careful about 
jumping to conclusions about why they exist. In New 
Zealand many fast food outlets specializing in the 
popular delicacy known as fish and chips are run by 
citizens of Greek descent in Wellington, but by Chinese 
and Vietnamese in Christchurch. Many dairies (our 
equivalent of the US convenience store) are owned 
and staffed by Indians. It is highly doubtful that either of 
these commercial situations has much, if any, genetic 
basis. The failures of logic that would occur in 
stereotyping all Indians as shopkeepers comes from 
regarding genetics (in the sense of ancestry) as fate 
and imposing group observations on individuals. Only 
in special instances can genes decide fate. This 
occurs, for example, in the case of Huntingdon’s 
Disease where receiving just one copy of a mutated 
gene leads to tortuous physical and mental decline 
from mid-life onwards. However, this type of situation is 
rare and most human traits have bewilderingly multi-
factorial genetics. Thus, if you want to be a basketball 
star it certainly helps to be tall. There is no question 
that human stature has some genetic determinants. 
Equally, there are nutritional and environmental 
determinants too. Sadly, just being tall does not mean 
that you will eventually be drafted to join an NBA team, 
regardless of the encouragement you might receive 
from your high school coach. Tagging all tall people as 
potential basketball players shows the second type of 
logical lapse in stereotyping – imposing perceived 
group values on individuals. This is what leads to 
discrimination and usually involves a great deal of false 
inference about cause and effect. The outcome is a 
sort of ‘blame game’ where real societal disadvantage 
is projected back onto the disadvantaged group(s) and 
seen as a product of their intrinsic moral or biological 
failings. 
At this point the realism debate takes centre stage 
[1]. What matters is whether race is real in a 
metaphysical sense. It makes scant little difference if 
this is biological realism or social realism. It is not easy 
to answer this question. One requires a two-step 
philosophical programme 1) to decide and describe the 
set of properties that something needs to be a real 
kind, 2) test how well human races (i.e. as defined the 
BR and SC models) match the requirement(s) for being 
real things. Indeed, it seems to be the very idea 
(correct or not) that races are real which fuels racism. 
Thus, it serves to rationalise what seems to be an 
inherent, intuitive and adaptive xenophobia. 
Judgemental comparisons such as “These people are 
just cockroaches” are tacked on the side for good 
measure. Here race or ethnicity is just used as a flag to 
signal out group members. Perhaps it would be better 
to turn the entire problem on its head and ask; If human 
races genuinely are real kinds, then how can we 
prevent ourselves from becoming racist (in the 
pejorative sense of this term).  
The third reason why this larger debate is important 
concerns medicine. Health care is becoming an 
increasingly genetic science. Hence, being able to 
interpret statistical data about self-identified 
race/ethnicity in relation to their patients is increasingly 
important for practitioners [54, 55]. The field of 
Pharmacogenomics has arisen through the realisation 
that new medicines researched by and tested in one 
ethnic population may not work as well in others. 
Events surrounding the drugs Bidil in the US and Iressa 
in Asia were taken as good first illustrations of this 
approach, but have since faced strong criticism from 
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some [29]. Many otherwise beneficial pharmaceuticals 
are recognised as poisonous foreign compounds 
(which in truth they often are) by the human body. This 
means that medication is often quickly scheduled for 
detoxification in the liver and excretion as soluble 
metabolites via the kidneys. One of the principal detox 
systems uses the hepatic cytochrome P450 catalytic 
complex; see for example our own work on these 
systems in New Zealanders [56, 57]. This is encoded 
by multiple genes and which all have many variants 
thereby providing a selective advantage in wide-
ranging biochemical response. As one might suppose, 
the frequencies of these variants differ between 
populations meaning that clearance rates will differ 
between them. This means that dose rates may need 
to be adjusted to suit patients based in part on their 
ancestry. And here it is ancestry that really matters, 
rather than ethnicity or ethnic affiliation; noting that in 
BR terms race and ancestry are exactly congruent 
concepts. This can be a tricky matter. Mersha and 
Abebe [55] Explain how the US Hispanic or Latino 
category includes Puerto Rican and Mexicans with the 
former having 18-25% African admixture and the latter 
35-64% Native American admixture based on the 
figures from [58]. These difficulties are not 
insurmountable and can best be solved by taking a 
careful family history from patients according to Braun 
et al. (2007), but noting earlier caveats regarding the 
reliability or otherwise about a person’s stated 
knowledge of their ancestry. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In the account presented here I have argued that 
the BR and SC viewpoints on race are both valid and 
mutually compatible. I claim that the division between 
them derives in large part from the commentaries by 
others on the Edwards/Lewontin debate. Social 
scientists have, in my view, been strongly drawn to the 
SC conceptualisation of race in part driven by concerns 
about racist stereotyping and in part by fear of 
perceived biological determinist agendas and eugenic 
thinking. Their position has been strengthened by the 
more or less widespread adoption of self-declared 
ethnic affiliation as an official reporting category for 
race. I have presented the view that this does not make 
their position exclusively correct. Rather, I have 
attempted to show that an avalanche of new genetic 
and genomic data makes biological races as ancestral 
geographic population clusters real to the point where 
their denial is perverse. However, I hold back from 
taking an extreme BR position, because by my account 
recovering these clusters from the data is itself, at least 
partly, a social construction.  
Thinking around this issue finds a ready application 
in New Zealand. The ancestors of Europeans and 
Maori first separated around 70 to 100,000 ybp as 
migrants from Africa. Since then their genomes have 
been subject to all the usual population level forces, 
mutation, genetic drift and natural selection etc. Their 
gene pools will have become different as a 
consequence. This expectation is now a fact. True 
much of their genetic material remains identical and 
thus is shared in common. But, there are plenty of 
differences too, and these can and have been 
measured in their descendants. Therefore, there is a 
genuine sense in which these groups absolutely must 
be real things. Surprisingly, it is not these real things 
them selves which feature in official statistics. The 
figures record how individuals see themselves, which 
adds noise to the ancestry signal. Worse still, many of 
these figures arise from processes, which depend on 
how others see the individual rather than vice versa 
which adds a further layer of complication. 
I believe that it is important that this debate should 
continue in the interest of improved and consistent 
official reporting of race/ethnicity data [2, 3]. It is of vital 
concern that this should be done in medicine, so that 
all might have access to treatments best suited to their 
individual needs. Some may see this proposal in a 
negative light as calling for “race-based medicine”. I 
reject this opinion and describe my recommendation as 
being for genetically informed medicine. Duster 
provides a detailed and valuable history and overview 
of this area [16], but concludes that this form of medical 
practice is a bad thing because it leads to a 
“reinscription of race”. Not all commentators agree with 
this conclusion; see Duster [17] for a list of criticisms 
and an energetic response. For the present, allele 
frequencies and allelic associations in ethnic groups 
serve only as proxies to guide practitioners. Thus, it is 
that a diagnosis of sickle-cell anaemia is only more 
likely for patients with some degree of West African 
ancestry, than it is for Europeans. The disease does 
occur in Europeans and may also be present due to 
undisclosed or unknown ancestral admixture. We look 
to a future where these considerations will be pushed 
aside by the advent of personalised genomic medicine. 
For the present, it should be enough to have the 
courage to recognise what we truly are and where we 
have come from. 
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